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Abstract 
 
Some philosophers and social scientists have stressed the importance for good government of an 
altruistic citizenry that values the well being of one another. Others have emphasized the need 
for incentives that induce even the self interested to contribute to the public good. Implicitly 
most have assumed that these two approaches are complementary or at worst additive. But this 
need not be the case. Behavioral experiments find that if reciprocity-minded subjects feel 
hostility towards free riders and enjoy inflicting harm on them, near efficient levels of 
contributions to a public good may be supported when group members have opportunities to 
punish low contributors. Cooperation may also be supported if individuals are sufficiently 
altruistic that they internalize the group benefits that their contributions produce. Using a utility 
function embodying both reciprocity and altruism we show that unconditional altruism towards 
other members attenuates the punishment motive and thus may reduce the level of punishment 
inflicted on defectors, resulting in lower rather than higher levels of contributions. Increases in 
altruism may also reduce the level of benefits from the public project net of contribution costs 
and punishment costs.  The negative effect of altruism on cooperation and material payoffs is 
greater the stronger is the reciprocity motive among the members.   
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1. Introduction 
Both altruism and reciprocity may motivate individuals to contribute to the provision of a 
public good. Altruism induces the individual to unconditionally value the payoff of other 
members, while reciprocity implies a valuation of the others’ payoffs that is conditional on their 
contributions (or other indications of their type).  Reciprocators may value the payoffs of low 
contributors negatively and be motivated to reduce the payoffs of defectors at a cost to 
themselves, when this option is available.  The prospect of punishment for low contributions may 
induce individuals to contribute more than they otherwise would (Fehr and Gaechter (2000), 
Anderson and Putterman (2006)). 
We explore the possibility that these two motives for contribution - a positive valuation 
of the payoffs of others and a desire to avoid the punishment induced by a negative valuation of 
one’s payoffs by others - may work at cross purposes. Specifically we show that by attenuating 
the punishment motive, a general increase in the level of unconditional altruism may reduce 
rather than increase contributions. 
Thus, while one often refers to individuals as being ‘cooperative’ or ‘uncooperative’, the 
motives supporting high levels of cooperation are heterogeneous, and they need not work 
synergistically.  For example,  experimental evidence indicates that unconditional altruists are 
significantly less likely to punish low contributors in a public goods game (Carpenter, Bowles, 
Gintis, and Hwang (Forthcoming)).  
In the next section we use the ideas of  Levine (1998),  Rabin (1993), and  Falk and 
Fischbacher (2006)  to explore the joint  effects of altruism toward fellow group members and 
reciprocity-based hostility towards low contributors in a public goods game.  In section 3 we 
study the Nash equilibrium levels of punishment and contribution under varying levels of 
unconditional altruism of the members of a group.  We show that because altruism may diminish 
the motivation to punish low contributors, the relationship between the level of altruism and 
contributions is non-monotonic, and that under plausible assumptions there exist a range of 
levels of altruism over which increases in altruism reduce both equilibrium levels of contribution 
and the sum of benefits from the public project net of the costs of contributing and the costs of 
punishing. The latter result is reminiscent of Bernheim and Stark (1988) who showed that 
increased altruism among two family members in a repeated game setting may be welfare-
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reducing. Finally we show that the range for which altruism is bad for cooperation and net 
benefits is larger the more reciprocal are the group members. In the conclusion we suggest some 
implications for how social preferences may support cooperation despite the sometimes 
counterproductive effects of increased altruism and the costly nature of punishment. 
2. Altruism, reciprocity and cooperation 
Consider a community of individuals indexed by 1,...,i n=  ( 3n ≥ ) who may contribute 
to a public project by supplying an amount of effort  ie  ? [0, 1]. The total contributions, kke∑ , 
result in a benefit of k
k
q e∑  which is shared equally among individuals in the community, while 
each individual experiences the cost of contribution, 21/ 2 ( )ie .  With the notation of /q nf ≡ , 
i ’s material payoff without the punishment  is   
(1) 21
2i k ik
e ep f= −∑  
We note that the marginal private benefit of contribution is f  and suppose that 1/ 1n f< < ; 
1/n f<  ensures that full contribution, 1ie = , is socially optimal whereas 1f <  means that in the 
absence of punishment selfish individuals under-contribute to the public project ( 1ie f= < ). 
After contributions have been observed, each individual i  can impose a cost on j i≠  
with monetary equivalent ijs  at cost ( )ij ijc s  to himself. The cost ijs  results from public criticism, 
shunning, ostracism, physical violence, exclusion from desirable side-deals, or another form of 
harm.   Hence i kik is s≠= ∑  is the punishment inflicted upon i  by other community members 
and ( )i ik ikk ic c s≠= ∑  is i ’s cost of punishing others.    
Individual j ’s standing as a cooperative member of community, jb ,  depends on j ’s 
level of effort and the contribution that j  makes to the group, which we assume is public 
knowledge. Specifically, we assume 
(2) 2 1j jb e= −  
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So 1jb = −  if j contributes nothing, and 1jb =  if j  contributes fully.  This means that 1/ 2je =  
is the point at which i  evaluates j ’s cooperative behavior as neither good nor bad. This point 
could be shifted to any value between 0 and 1, but the added generality is not illuminating.  
To model cooperative behavior with social preferences, we say that individual i ’s utility 
depends on his own material payoff ip , the payoff kp  to other individuals k i≠ , the cost of 
punishing others, and the punishment inflicted on i , according to  
(3) 1 ( )( )
1i i i i i i k k ikk i
u c s a b s
n
p l p
≠
= − − + + −− ∑  
where the parameter ia , 1 1ia− < < ,  is i ’s level of unconditional altruism if 0ia >  and 
unconditional spite if 0ia <  and 0 1il≤ ≤  is the strength of 'i s reciprocity motive, valuing j ’s 
payoffs more highly if j  conforms to i ’s concept of good behavior, and conversely (The 
function is similar to Levine (1998), but 'i s evaluation of k ’s type is here based on k ’s actions 
in a particular game, rather than on k ’s level of altruism). The valuation of others’ payoffs is 
weighted by the inverse of the number of other members so that changes in group size do not 
alter the importance of an individual’s own payoffs relative to the payoffs of others. The cost to 
i  of punishing j , ijc  is increasing in the level of punishment inflicted and it may also increase 
with i ’s level of altruism due to the discomfort that altruists may experience in punishing fellow 
group members. So we have ( )ij ijc s =½ 2( 1) ( )i ija sk+  for 0k ≥ . 
Note (from (3)) that an individual punishing a shirker values the punishment per se rather 
than the benefits likely to accrue to the punisher if the shirker responds positively to the 
punishment. Members have an intrinsic motivation to punish the shirker, not simply a desire that 
the shirker should be punished by someone. This means that punishing is ‘warm glow’ rather 
than instrumental towards affecting j ’s behavior (Andreoni, 1990; de Quervain et. al. 2004; 
Casari and Luini, 2008; Anderson and Putterman, 2006). To avoid semantic confusion, note that 
unconditional altruism and the reciprocity-based spite that motivates punishment of low 
contributors are both forms of altruism as defined by biologists  (assuming that the group 
benefits associated with the increased contributions induced by punishment outweigh the costs of 
punishment). Individuals acting according to these motives increase average payoffs in the group 
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but would enhance their own payoffs were they to (respectively) not contribute or forgo 
punishing low contributors. We use the term altruism for its unconditional variant.  
3. Altruism versus cooperation? 
 We model a two-stage optimization process in which individual i  selects an effort level 
taking account of the effect of this choice on the punishment inflicted on i  by other team 
members. Because we wish to study the effect of a general increase in the altruism of all group 
members, we suppose that individuals in the community are homogenous: il l≡  and ia a≡  for 
all i .  To find the punishment inflicted on i , we first determine j ’s decision concerning the 
punishment of  i  depending on i ’s contribution level:  
(4) * 1( ) arg max ( , ,..., , ) for all 
ji
ji i j j j jn j
s
s e u e s s s j i= ≠  
With 2( ) 1/ 2( 1) ( )ji jic s a s
k= +  member j ’s  choice of *jis  in (4) gives the first order condition  
for an interior solution as follows. 
(5) [ ]* * 1( ) ( 1) (1 2 )
1ji ji i
c s a s e a
n
k l′ = + = − −−  
or the marginal cost of punishing is equal to the marginal benefit of reducing i ’s payoffs given 
j ’s assessment of i ’s type, net of the subjective costs of inflicting this punishment on i  given 
j ’s level of unconditional altruism. When 0l =  and 0a < , j  punishes i , but independent of 
i ’s contribution level. If 0l =  and 0a ≥ ,  no punishment occurs.  If  0l >  and 
(6) 0
1 ( )
2i
e e all≥ ≡ −  
then member j  does not punish. Thus j ’s punishment of i  is  
(7) 0*
0
1 [ (1 2 ) ] if
( 1) ( 1)( )
0 if
i i
ji i
i
e a e e
a ns e
e e
k l⎧ − − <⎪ + −= ⎨⎪ ≥⎩
 
Note that the level of contribution that i  must make to avoid punishment by j  is declining in 
j ’s level of altruism. 
From (7) we can find the total punishment inflicted on individual i , * *( ) ( )i i ji ij is e s e≠=∑  
which is then non-increasing and differentiable when it is positive.  Next individual i  decides 
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the level of effort by taking account of the effect of his effort choice on the level of punishment 
he will receive. Thus member i  will choose 
(8) *1( , ) arg max ( ) ( , ,..., , ( ))
i
i i i i i i in i i
e
e e a v e u e s s s e− = ≡  
Equation (8) defines member i ’s best effort response to other’s effort levels, ( , )i i ie e e a−= . To 
find i ’s best response explicitly we proceed as follows. When there is no punishment of i , 
interior solution of * ( , )Ni ie e a−  for (8) satisfies the following first order condition (recall 
2 1j jb e= − ). 
(9) * 1( , ) ( )
1
N
i i l
l i
e e a a b
n
f l f−
≠
= + +− ∑  
where 1 1 1( ,.., , ,..., )i i i ne e e e e− − +=   
Thus when no punishment is inflicted, i ’s optimal choice of ie  equates the marginal cost of 
contribution ( ie  itself) to the direct benefits to i  of contributing to the project, f , plus i ’s 
valuation on others’ material payoffs.  Similarly when i  is subject to punishment (hence 0ie e< ), 
i  chooses ie  to satisfy the following first order condition : 
(10) * *1( , ) ( ) ( )
1
P
i i l i i
l i
e e a a b s e
n
f l f−
≠
≡ + + − ′− ∑  
which requires that i  take account of the effect of increased contribution in reducing punishment, 
as well as the marginal costs and benefits of the project expressed in the no-punishment first 
order condition  (9). Since * ( ) 2 /( 1) 0i is e a
kl= − + <′ , we see that * *( , ) ( , )P Ni i i ie e a e e a− −> ; 
punishment supports a higher contribution level.  The amount contributed by i  will depend on 
whether punishment is present or not, and this will depend on the level of unconditional altruism 
of the members of the group. There exist critical values , a  and a , such that the best response 
for member i  is following. 
(11) 
*
*
( , ) if 
1 ( ) if
2
( , ) if
P
i i
i
N
i i
e e a a a
e a a a a
e e a a a
ll
−
−
⎧ <⎪⎪= − < <⎨⎪⎪ <⎩
 
Figure 1 illustrates equation (11).  
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Figure 1. Equilibrium contributions as a function of group member’s altruism. To the left of 
a  contributions may be rising or falling in a  (equation (10)). 
 
When altruism is lower than a , i  is subject to punishments by others so the effort level 
is determined by equation (10) and hence may be decreasing or increasing in a . To see this, note 
that  
(12) 
*
1
2
( 1)
P
ie
a a k
klf +
∂ = −∂ +  
which may be negative if k and l  are sufficiently large so that the positive effect of altruism (the 
increased valuation by i  of the other members payoffs that are enhanced by i 's contributions) is 
offset by the negative effect (the increased cost of others punishing i  reduces i ’s punishment 
avoidance motives for contributing.)  If the cost of punishing does not increase with the 
individual's altruism ( 0k = ) then * /Pie a∂ ∂ , so over this range contributions increase with 
altruism.  
If altruism is greater than a ,  the expected positive effect of altruism occurs because 
altruism enhances the members’ valuation of the external benefits that their contribution allow, 
while the offsetting effect (the reduced punishment avoidance motive) does not exist because 
contribution levels are high enough so that punishment does not occur. In the intermediate range 
a  a a  
*P
i ie e=  
0ie e=  
*N
i ie e=  
no punishment: 0
1 ( )
2i
e e all≥ = −  punishment 
No Punishment 
0k =  
0k >  
ie  
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of altruism, equation (6) is binding so an increase in altruism decreases the equilibrium effort 
level since altruism lowers the threshold level of effort required to avoid being punished. 
Does the ‘altruism unambiguously bad for cooperation’ range ( , )a a  occur for plausible 
parameter values? Recall that ie f=  is the choice of selfish individuals in the absence of 
punishment and 1/ 2ie =  is the critical point around which i ’s behavior is judged to be good or 
bad. Thus when the private marginal benefit of contribution, f ,  is small,  so that a selfish 
individual is motivated to be a  bad type (i.e. when 1/ 2f < ) and members have reciprocal 
motives (l  is positive),  members would punish others and punishment would induce a higher 
effort level. So we infer that 1/ 2f < and positive l are necessary conditions for the existence of 
an interior equilibrium with positive punishment.  And if the reciprocity motive is sufficiently 
strong among community members that the threshold level of effort to avoid punishment, 0e , 
reaches 1, an equilibrium with any positive punishment is characterized as full contributions by 
members. When we exclude cases in which punishment never occurs or in which when it does 
full contribution is always the result, i.e. when we suppose 1/ 2f <  and 1/ 4 / 2 0.15f l− < < , 
we obtain the following proposition.   
 
Proposition. We suppose that 1/ 4 / 2 0.15f l− < <  and 1/ 2f < .  For 0k k< , we can find a  and 
a  such that  
 
*
0 for ( , )de a a a
da
< ∈  
where *e  is a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we have 
 ( ) 0d a a
dl − >   
Proof. See appendix. É 
Note that the proposition holds for 0k = (altruism does not affect the cost of punishing). 
The second part of proposition  - that the range over which altruism has a negative effect is 
increasing in the degree of reciprocity - occurs because the stronger reciprocity motive is, the 
bigger is the gap between best responses with and without punishment.  From 1/ 4 / 2l f> −  we 
have 0a < , so contributions are declining in a  not only over the range of positive a but also 
8 
 
over some range of reductions in spite.  Note that while increases in altruism for values of a  
above a  increase the benefits of the public project net of contribution costs and punishment 
costs, the reverse is true in the ‘altruism unambiguously bad for cooperation’ range. Here 
punishment costs are zero, but increases in altruism reduce contributions to the public good, thus 
lowering the net benefits. For values of a  less than a  net benefits of the project increase in the 
level of altruism if contributions also increase. But if contributions are declining in a , then net 
benefits may either increase or decrease in the level of altruism.  
We do not explore the conceptually challenging effect of an increase in altruism on 
subjective welfare given that the change in altruism is itself a change in preferences (Bergstrom, 
2006) analogous to a free resource allowing costless increases in subjective well being. Nor do 
we address the possibility that were incentive mechanisms other than peer punishment allowed, a 
general increase in altruism could support more efficient outcomes. If the set of alternative 
mechanisms is unrestricted this is trivially the case (subsidizing contributions in a complete 
information setting would achieve this) and there is no non-arbitrary way to expand the set of 
alternative mechanisms while retaining the underlying problems of public goods provision. Our 
representation of the motive for punishment - hostility toward those who violate cooperative 
norms - could be expanded so that the extent of hostility is enhanced by feelings of altruism 
towards those that the defector has harmed. In this case a general increase in altruism would (as 
in the current model) make individuals more reluctant to harm defectors, but it would also 
increase hostility toward defectors, possibly offsetting the first effect.  Finally, had we assumed a 
sophisticated instrumental motive for punishing others, increased altruism could enhance 
punishment and contributions. The reason is that in this (we think empirically implausible) 
'strategic punishing' model, the prospective punisher takes account of  the other members' 
prospective gains resulting from the target's expected positive contribution response to the 
punishment. For sufficient levels of altruism these gains might outweigh the negative effect of 
altruism on the non-strategic punishment motive.   
    Our assumption of a common set of preferences is appropriate for the question we have 
addressed, but recognizing the heterogeneous nature of preferences would illuminate a further 
interesting set of issues. In a mixed population of altruists, reciprocators, and self-interested 
types,  for example,  reciprocators might punish the altruists as free riders on their civic minded 
punishment of self-interested defectors. Analysis of the many possible equilibria for this problem 
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would depend critically on the extent of public and private information and the availability of a 
common culture or other coordinating mechanisms. We suspect that under plausible 
assumptions relatively homogeneous sub-populations might outperform mixed populations, and 
hence might be favored in the process of group formation and the evolution of cultures. But we 
have not studied this case in detail. 
4. Conclusion 
Some philosophers and social scientists have stressed the importance for good 
government of an altruistic citizenry that values the well being of one another. Others have 
emphasized the need for incentives that induce even the self-interested to contribute to the public 
good. Implicitly most have assumed that these two approaches are complementary or at worst 
additive. It is now recognized that this assumption may fail where the presence of monetary or 
other explicit incentives reduces the salience of altruistic or other public-spirited motives 
(Benabou and Tirole (2003); Benabou and Tirole (2006); Bowles (2008); Falk and Kosfeld 
(2006); Sliwka (2007); Bowles and Hwang (2008)).  But as we have seen, the assumption need 
not hold even in the absence of such motivational crowding out.  
Our results suggest that for a community wishing to sustain high levels of cooperation,  
efforts to enhance unconditional altruism may be counter-productive and that enhancing the level 
of citizen reciprocity  may exacerbate the negative effects of altruism. But punishment may also 
be counter-productive. By definition acts of altruism increase the joint surplus of the community; 
but punishment is often (as in our model) resource-using. Unless or until  levels of contribution 
sufficient to make punishment rare are achieved, the  costs associated with punishment of low 
contributors may more than offset the gains to cooperation that the punishment allows 
(Herrmann, Thoni, and Gaechter (2008), Gaechter, Renner, and Sefton (2008)).  This is 
particularly true in a case we have not considered, namely when vendetta-like cycles of 
punishment and counter punishment are allowed. (Hopfensitz and Reuben (2006)).   
Nonetheless, cooperation sustained by a combination of altruism and reciprocity-based 
punishment may be welfare enhancing. This is true in part because punishment is not only an 
incentive; it is also a signal.  The incentive-based response to punishment may be enhanced by 
the feelings of shame that punishment by peers triggers (Bowles and Gintis (2006).)  In part for 
this reason disapproval  by peers may induce members to contribute even when it is expressed in 
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non-resource-using ways such as gossip, ridicule or the simple statement that the individual has 
violated a norm (Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003), Barr (2001), Wiessner (2005)).  
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Appendix 
 Proof of Proposition 
We find ( )e e a=  such that * ( , )Pie e e a= . 
(13) (1 ) 2 1( )
1 2 1 2 1 2 ( 1)
e a a
a k
f f l l
lf lf lf
−= + +− − − +  
We take 0 3k =  and let 0k k<  and ( ) ( ) 1/(2 ) ( )g a e a al l≡ − − . Then we define a   satisfying 
(14) ( ) 0g a =   and ( ) 0g a′ >  
Such a  exists since our assumptions ensure that minimum of ( )g a  achieves at a l< − , 
( ) 0g l− < , and (0) 0g > . Then we verify that a  satisfies  
(15) al− <  
(16) * 1( ) ( ) for 
2
e a a a al ll< − − < <  
Similarly we find ( )e e a=  such that * ( , )Nie e e a= .  
(17) (1 )( )
1 2 1 2
e a a
f f l
lf lf
−= +− −  
We define a  for which ( ) 1/(2 ) ( ) 0e a al l− − = . 
(18) (1 2 )a l f= −  
By our choices of a  and a , we have  1 1a al l− < − < < < < .  Now if a a<  then 
01/(2 ) ( ) 1e a el l< − = < . Hence when a a< , *e e=  constitutes a Nash equilibrium.   
Then for 0a a> > , 01/(2 ) ( )e a el l> − = . Thus * min{ ,1}e e=  is a Nash equilibrium.  Finally  
if a a a< < , then 0e e e< <  thus * 1/(2 ) ( )e al l= − becomes a Nash equilibrium. From this the 
first part of proposition follows. We summarize this result. 
(19) *
( ) if  
1 ( ) if
2
min{ ( ),1} if
e a a a
e a a a a
e a a a
l
ll
l
− < <⎧⎪⎪= − < <⎨⎪ < <⎪⎩
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Concerning the second part of proposition, by differentiating ( ) 0g a =  with respect to l  
we find  
(20) 
2 2
2 2
(1 4 ) 2 [2(1 ) 2 ]
( )[2 (1 2 ) ]
da a a
d g a
klf l f f
l l lf
−− − + + − += − ′ −  
Since 0a <   and 1/ 2f <  imply 22(1 ) 2 0a k f f−+ − + > , the numerator of (20) is positive. Thus 
we have / 0da dl < . Since / 0da dl > , the result follows. É 
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